Let P be a true proposition expressing a total state of the world at a time before anyone had any choice about anything. Let L be the conjunction of the laws of nature. And let P be an arbitrary true proposition. Then the argument can be stated as follows:
The Consequence Argument (standard modal version) ( ) ◻((P & L) ⊃ P) A consequence of determinism ( ) ◻(P ⊃ (L ⊃ P)) From ( ) by normal modal logic ( ) N(P ⊃ (L ⊃ P)) From ( ) by Alpha ( ) NP Premiss, xity of the past ( ) N(L ⊃ P)
From ( ) and ( ) by Beta ( ) NL Premiss, xity of the laws ( ) NP From ( ) and ( ) by Beta
] The validity of this argument, however, depends on how, in the de nition of Np, we understand someone's having a choice about whether p. We need to distinguish the following readings (McKay and Johnson : and Carlson : ):
N W p = df p, and no one is, or ever was, able to act so that p would be false.
N M p = df p, and no one is, or ever was, able to act so that p might be false.
That a person S is able to act at t so that p would (might) be false means that S is able to act at t in such a way that, if S were to act in that way at t, then p would (might) be false (Carlson : ). The premisses of the Consequence Argument are notably weaker given the N W reading than given the N M reading. But, given the N W reading, there are counter-examples to Beta (Widerker : -, McKay and Johnson : -, and Carlson ) . Suppose, for instance, that S does not toss a coin, although she can do so. Let p = "the coin does not land heads", and let q = "the coin is not tossed". S is not able to ensure that p is false. She cannot ensure that the coin lands heads; if she were to toss it, it might land heads, but it might just as well land tails. Hence, Np is true. Similarly, S cannot ensure the falsity of p ⊃ q. If she were to toss the coin, p ⊃ q might be false (since the coin might land tails), but it might equally well be true (since the coin might land heads). Thus, N(p ⊃ q) is also true. -) . So, to rid the Consequence Argument from counter-examples to its validity, it appears that we must give its premisses the stronger N M reading. This is also van Inwagen's move. I shall show, however, that we can do better: We only need to give one of the premisses the stronger N M reading. The other premiss can have the weaker N W reading.
Consider the following inference rules for N W and N M :
To avoid this counter-example, O'Connor ( : ) suggests the following revision:
, Np, and p is made true earlier than q, deduce Nq.
Nonetheless, Carlson puts forward a more complicated counter-example that also applies to Beta ′ :
At time t S can either press or not press a certain button, which is connected to a coin-tossing mechanism. If she presses the button, the mechanism will toss the coin twice, rst at t , and then again at a later time, t . If S does not press the button, the coin will only be tossed once, at t . Suppose that S presses the button, and that the coin lands heads in both tosses. Let p = "the coin is tossed at t , and lands heads", and let q = "the coin is tossed at t , and lands heads". Since the coin might land tails in the t -toss, whatever S does at t , Np is true. [. . .] If S would refrain from pressing the button, the coin might land tails in the t -toss, in which case p ⊃ q would still be true. Hence, N(p ⊃ q) is true. On the other hand, Nq is false. By not pressing the button, S can ensure the falsity of q. Moreover, p is made true earlier than q.
A similar revision, however, avoids that counter-example too:
, Np, and no one has any choice before p was already made true about whether q, deduce Nq.
Given that P is made true before anyone had any choice about anything, one could rely on Beta ′′ in a version of the Consequence Argument. Yet the plausibility of Beta ′′ depends on the plausibility that, once a proposition has been made true, one is unable to act so that it might be false. To see this, suppose we change Carlson's example so that S's choice whether to press the button occurs not at t but at t . (that is, a er t but before t ) and the coin still did land heads in the t -toss but, if S were to refrain from pressing at t . , the coin might have landed tails in the t -toss. 
From ( ) and ( ) ( ) Someone is or was able to act so that q would be false.
From ( ) and ( ) ( ) For all persons S, all possible acts ϕ, and all present and past times t such that S is able to ϕ at t, if S were to ϕ at t, then S would act at t so that p ⊃ q would be true.
From ( ) ( ) Someone is or was able to act so that ∼q & (p ⊃ q) would be true.
From ( ) and ( ) ( ) Someone is or was able to act so that p would be false.
From ( ) and ( )
We have that N M (p ⊃ q) and N W p together entail N W q. Hence Beta MW is valid. Still, some of the inferences in this argument might need some explanation. For the inference from ( ) and ( ) to ( ), note that N M (p ⊃ q) entails p ⊃ q and that N W p entails p. The idea behind the inference from ( ) to ( ) is simply that, if one is unable to do anything such that p ⊃ q might be false, then it must be that, for the things one is able to do, p ⊃ q would be true if one were to do any of those things. , The inference from ( ) and ( ) to ( ) is perhaps controversial. It follows from ( ) that some person S is able to do [p.
] something at some time t such that ∼q would be true if S were to do that thing at t, and it follows from ( ) that, if S were to do that thing at t, then S would act at t so that p ⊃ q would be true. Hence S is able to act at t so that both ∼q and p ⊃ q would be true. And then S is able to act at t so that ∼q & (p ⊃ q) would be true.
There is an analogous argument that Beta WM is valid:
From ( ) and ( ) ( ) For all persons S, all possible acts ϕ, and all present and past times t such that S is able to ϕ at t, if S were to ϕ at t, then S would act at t so that p would be true.
From ( ) ( ) Someone is or was able to act so that p & ∼q would be true.
From ( ) and ( ) ( ) Someone is or was able to act so that p ⊃ q would be false.
From ( ) and ( ) ( ) N W q From ( ) and ( ) This inference is valid given the right-to-le direction of Lewis's ( : ) duality de nition of 'might' counterfactuals:
that is,
We don't need the more controversial le -to-right direction, that is,
Given Duality Le -to-Right, Stalnaker's ( : ) seemingly non-paradoxical claim that John might not have come to the party if he had been invited, but I believe he would have come amounts to a Moorean paradox.
The restriction to present and past times in ( ) is needed unless we strengthen the N operators so that Np also rules out that anyone will have a choice about whether p. That strengthening wouldn't make the premisses any less plausible.
This inference is valid if the following inference rule is valid: The Consequence Argument (weak-xity-of-the-past version)
Premiss, strong xity of the laws ( ) N W P From ( ) and ( ) by Beta WM
The Consequence Argument (weak-xity-of-the-laws version)
Premiss, weak xity of the laws ( ) N W (P ⊃ P)
From ( ) and ( ) by Beta MW ( ) N M P Premiss, strong xity of the past ( ) N W P From ( ) and ( ) by Beta WM Thus we have two new options for raising the price of compatibilism. Of these, the weak-xity-of-the-laws version is, I think, especially compelling. Given a necessitarian view of laws of nature, both the weak and the strong xity-of-the-laws premisses seem plausible. But consider a Humean view of laws, where these laws hold contingently and merely describe (rather than prescribe) how the world develops. Given this kind of view, there seems to be little reason to accept the strong xity-of-the-laws premiss, that is, N M L (Vihvelin : ; : -and Beebee and
One might object that, in these versions of the Consequence Argument, we could replace Alpha M and Beta MW by the following variant of Beta suggested by Widerker ( : ):
This would let us infer ( ) directly from ( ) and ( ) and thus skip lemma ( ). Yet the plausibility of Beta ◻W depends on the plausibility of logically necessary propositions' being unavoidable in the strong sense, that is, it depends on the plausibility of Alpha M . It's clearer to treat the transfer of unavoidability separately from the relation between unavoidability and logical necessity, since these are two distinct, controversial issues. See also footnote .
Mele : -). To see this, suppose, as seems fairly plausible, that, if it's still contingent shortly a er p is made true whether ∼q will be made true, then the 'might' counterfactual 'If it were the case that p, it might be the case that ∼q' is true, even if p and q are true. (If, for example, S will toss a coin at t which will in fact land heads, it still seems plausible that, if S were to toss the coin t, it might land tails.) Then, given a Humean view, there's a trivial argument against the strong xity-of-the-laws premiss. Plausibly, you are able to do what you actually do. And, if you are able to do what you actually do and shortly a erwards it's still contingent what laws will turn out to be the actual [p. ] laws of nature, then you're able to act so that L might be false. Hence, on a Humean view of laws, N M L could plausibly be denied.
But denying the weak xity-of-the-laws premiss -that is, N W L -is less trivial. I shall highlight two problems. To see them, assume rst that N W L is false. If N W L is false, someone must at some point have been able to act otherwise than they actually did. Let t be the rst time t such that, for some true proposition P, someone was able to act at t so that P would be false. And let P be a true proposition expressing the total state of the world at a time before, but arbitrarily close to, t . From N M P , we have that the total state of the world before t is xed. To block an application of the weak-xity-of-the-laws version of the Consequence Argument at t , we have that N W L is false at t and hence that some person S is able to act at t so that L would be false.
The rst problem is a deterministic variant of the luck problem for libertarianism. Since S does not in fact act at t so that L would be false, no feature of the total state of the world before t -including S's character, deliberation, and mental states -ensures that S acts at t so that L would This claim is ruled out by Lewis's ( : , ) account of counterfactuals, which combines the duality de nition of 'might' counterfactuals (see footnote ) with
But the claim is compatible with Lewis's ( : -) would-be-possible account of 'might' counterfactuals.
Compare Finch and War eld's ( : ) analogous point about the Mind Argument.
Or, if time is dense, let t be an arbitrarily early such time. Lewis ( : -) only takes the remote past to be xed. But, as argued by Ginet ( : -) and Huemer ( : -), the reason the remote past seems xed is that it is the past and not because it is, in addition, remote. Lewis ( : -, ) argues fairly convincingly that, if one were to act otherwise, there would have been a divergence miracle shortly before the act. But it doesn't follow that one is able to act so that there would have been a divergence miracle shortly before the act; see Ekstrom : and Huemer : -. Beebee and Mele ( : -) spell out the parallels between the luck problem for libertarianism and this variant for Humean compatibilism. be false. But then, if S had acted at t so that L would have been false, it is hard to see what could explain the di erence in acting, since everything about S and the state of the world before t would have been exactly the same as it was in the actual world. Given a Humean view of the laws of nature, no di erence in these laws could explain the di erence in acting, since the laws then depend on what happens, rather than the other way around. Hence it seems that the acting so that L would be false would have been due not to S's agency but to chance. Without chance turning out otherwise than it actually [p.
] did, there's nothing S could have done to render L false at t . It seems that S is merely able to act at t so that L might be false -acting so that L would be false at t would have required chance to turn out otherwise -hence it seems that S is unable to act at t so that L would be false.
The second problem is that S's ability to act at t so that L would be false requires that S has the incredible ability to break the laws of nature (Beebee and Mele : -). To see this, note that, since P expresses the total state of the world at a time just before t , we have from N M P that the actual state of the world just before t is exactly the same as it would have been just before t if S had acted at t so that L would have been false. Hence the laws wouldn't have been broken by some miracle before t ; the laws would be broken by S's act. Thus rejecting N W L at t requires that S has the incredible ability to do something at t such that, if S did it, S's act would break what are in fact the laws of nature. , One might object that the laws could explain the di erence retroactively. Note, however, that a key part of what gives laws their explanatory power is their overall simplicity and coherence. Lewis points out that
The violated deterministic law has presumably not been replaced by a contrary law. Indeed, a version of the violated law, complicated and weakened by a clause to permit the one exception, may still be simple and strong enough to survive as a law.
If a law would have been simpler and more coherent without the ad hoc clause that makes the one exception permitting your acting otherwise, then that law cannot, plausibly, explain your acting otherwise. Note that I'm not assuming here that acting so that p would be false requires that one has control over whether p, that is, by also being able to instead act so that p would be true. Thus I'm not ruling out that one is able to act so that p would be false if so acting requires chance to turn out a certain way. If chance turns out the required way, one might arguably be able to act so that p would be false. My claim is merely that, if acting so that p would be false requires chance to turn out a certain way and chance doesn't turn out in the required way, then one is unable to act so that p would be false.
See footnote . Thus we close Lewis's ( : ) loophole that the act that would render P & L false 'would not itself falsify any law -not if all the requisite lawbreaking were over and done with beforehand'; see Huemer : -; . That is, S would have rendered the law false in Lewis's ( : ) strong sense. One might wonder why -if one accepts a Humean view of laws -one wouldn't While these two problems for denying N W L are perhaps surmountable, they are not problems for denying N M L given a Humean view. On a Humean view, it's contingent what laws will turn out to be the actual laws of nature. So, as we argued earlier, no matter how you were to act, you would be acting so that L might be false. And, since this holds even if you don't act otherwise than you actually do, there is no need to explain any di erence in acting compared to how you actually act; so the rst problem doesn't apply. Regarding the second problem, note that acting so that L might be false doesn't require any incredible ability if, regardless of what you do, L might be false. Thus, on a Humean view, denying N M L raises neither of these problems, while denying N W L raises both. [p. ]
The weak-xity-of-the-past version has perhaps also an advantage. There are two main lines of argument in support of the xity-of-thepast premiss. One is based on the idea that the past is xed in the sense that, when we evaluate counterfactuals, we try to keep the (remote) past xed. This counterfactual-xity argument seems to support not just the weak version of the premiss but also the strong version. The other line of argument is based on the idea that the past isn't up to us, that is, the idea that the past is not under our present control. This present-control argument supports N W P but not N M P . It doesn't support N M P , because the past might fail to be xed in a way that is independent of our acts. That is, regardless of what anyone did, many possible pasts including the actual past might be the past -so P might be true, and P might be false. And then the past wouldn't be up to us: no one [p.
] would be able to act so that P would be false. N W P would be true, but N M P would be false. Thus one of the main lines of argument in support of the xity of the past only supports the weak version of the premiss.
Denying the weak xity premisses is hence more challenging than denying their strong variants. While this doesn't amount to a defence of incompatibilism, it shows that the new strengthened versions of the Consequence Argument are more problematic for compatibilism than the version that requires both strong xity of the past and strong xity of be willing to just bite this bullet and accept, as a consequence of the contingency of the laws, that we have this ability. Isn't this just a consequence of the overall Humean set-up? No. The contingency of the laws doesn't require that they are up to us; that's a further tenet of Humean compatibilism. 
